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Abstract. We develop a new methodology to assess cryptographic key
strength using cloud computing, by calculating the true economic cost
of (symmetric- or private-) key retrieval for the most common crypto-
graphic primitives. Although the present paper gives both the current
(2012) and last years (2011) costs, more importantly it provides the tools
and infrastructure to derive new data points at any time in the future,
while allowing for improvements such as of new algorithmic approaches.
Over time the resulting data points will provide valuable insight in the
selection of cryptographic key sizes. 3
1 Introduction
An important task for cryptographers is the analysis and recommendation of pa-
rameters, crucially including key size and thus implying key strength, for cryp-
tographic primitives; clearly this is of theoretic and practical interest, relating
to the study and the deployment of said primitives respectively. As a result,
considerable effort has been, and is being, expended with the goal of provid-
ing meaningful data on which such recommendations can be based. Roughly
speaking, two main approaches dominate: use of special-purpose hardware de-
signs, including proposals such as [14, 15, 37, 38] (some of which have even been
realised), and use of more software-oriented (or at least less bespoke) record set-
ting computations such as [4, 5, 17]. The resulting data can then be extrapolated
using complexity estimates for the underlying algorithms, and appropriate ver-
sions of Moore’s Law, in an attempt to assess the longevity of associated keys.
In [19] this results in key size recommendations for public-key cryptosystems
that offer security comparable to popular symmetric cryptosystems; in [23] it
leads to security estimates in terms of hardware cost or execution time. Exist-
ing work for estimating symmetric key strengths (as well as other matters) is
discussed in [39].
It is not hard to highlight disadvantages in these approaches. Some special-
purpose hardware designs are highly optimistic; they all suffer from substantial
upfront costs and, as far as we have been able to observe, are always harder
3 We see this as a living document, which will be updated as algorithms, the Amazon
pricing model, and other factors change. The current version is V1.1 of May 2012;
updates will be posted on http://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/~nigel/Cloud-Keys/.
to get to work and use than expected. On the other hand, even highly spec-
ulative designs may be useful in exploring new ideas and providing insightful
lower bounds. Despite being more pragmatic, software-oriented estimates do not
necessarily cater adequately for the form or performance of future generations
of general-purpose processors (although so far straightforward application of
Moore’s Law is remarkably reliable, with various dire prophecies, such as the
“memory wall”, not materialising yet). For some algorithms, scaling up effort
(e.g., focusing on larger keys) requires no more than organisational skill com-
bined with patience. Thus, record setting computation that does not involve
new ideas may have little or no scientific value: for the purposes of assessing key
strength, a partial calculation is equally valuable. For some other algorithms,
only the full computation adequately prepares for problems one may encounter
when scaling up, and overall (in)feasibility may thus yield useful information.
Finally, for neither the hardware- nor software-oriented approach, is there a uni-
form, or even well understood, metric by which “cost” should be estimated. For
example, one often overlooks the cost of providing power and cooling, a foremost
concern for modern, large-scale installations.
Despite these potential disadvantages and the fact that papers such as [19]
and [23] are already a decade old, their results have proved to be quite resilient
and are widely used. This can be explained by the fact that standardisation of
key size requires some sort of long term extrapolation: there is no choice but to
take the inherent uncertainty and potential unreliability for granted. In this pa-
per we propose to complement traditional approaches, using an alternative that
avoids reliance on special-purpose hardware, one time experiments, or record cal-
culations, and that adopts a business-driven and thus economically relevant cost
model. Although extrapolations can never be avoided, our approach minimises
their uncertainty because whenever anyone sees fit, he/she can use commodity
hardware to repeat the experiments and verify and update the cost estimates.
In addition we can modify our cost estimates as our chosen pricing mechanism
alters over time.
The current focus on cloud computing is widely described as a significant
long-term shift in how computing services are delivered. In short, cloud com-
puting enables any party to rent a combination of computational and storage
resources that exist within managed data centers; the provider we use is the
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud [3], however others are available. The crux of
our approach is the use of cloud computing to assess key strength (for a specific
cryptographic primitive) in a way that provides a useful relationship to a true
economic cost. Crucially, we rely on the fact that cloud computing providers
operate as businesses: assuming they behave rationally, the pricing model for
each of their services takes into account the associated purchase, maintenance,
power and replacement costs. In order to balance reliability of revenue against
utilisation, it is common for such a pricing model to incorporate both long-term
and supply and demand driven components. We return to the issue of supply
and demand below, but for the moment assume this has a negligible effect on the
longer-term pricing structure of Amazon in particular. As a result, the Amazon
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pricing model provides a valid way to attach a monetary cost to key strength.
A provider may clearly be expected to update their infrastructures and pricing
model as technology and economic conditions dictate; indeed we show the ef-
fact of this over the last 18 months or so. However, by ensuring our approach
is repeatable, for example using commodity cloud computing services and plat-
form agnostic software, we are able to track results as they evolve over time.
We suggest this, and the approach as a whole, should therefore provide a robust
understanding of how key size recommendations should be made.
In Section 2 we briefly explain our approach and those aspects of the Amazon
Elastic Compute Cloud that we depend on. In Section 3 we describe our analysis
applied to a number of cryptographic primitives, namely DES, AES, SHA-2, RSA
and ECC. Section 4 and Section 5 contains concluding remarks. Throughout, all
monetary quantities are given in US dollars.
2 The Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) is a web-service that provides compu-
tational and storage resource “in the cloud” (i.e., on the Internet) to suit the
specific needs of each user. In this section we describe the current (per May
2012) EC2 hardware platform and pricing model, and compare it with the pre-
vious (per Feb 2011) pricing model, from a point of view that is relevant for our
purposes.
EC2 Compute Units. At a high level, EC2 consists of numerous installations
(or data centers) each housing numerous processing nodes (a processor core with
some memory and storage) which can be rented by users. In an attempt to qualify
how powerful a node is, EC2 uses the notion of an EC2 Compute Unit, or ECU
for short. One ECU provides the equivalent computational capacity of a 1.0-1.2
GHz Opteron or Xeon processor circa 2007, which were roughly state of the art
when EC2 launched. When new processors are deployed within EC2, they are
given an ECU-rating; currently there are at least four different types of core,
rated at 1, 2, 2.5 and 3.25 ECUs. The lack of rigour in the definition of an ECU
(e.g., identically clocked Xeon and Opteron processors do not have equivalent
computational capacity) is not a concern for our purposes.
Instances. An instance refers to a specified amount of dedicated compute ca-
pacity that can be purchased: it depends on the processor type (e.g., 32- or
64-bit), the number of (virtualised) cores (1, 2, 4 or 8), the ECU-rating per
core, memory and storage capacity, and network performance. There are cur-
rently thirteen different instances, partitioned into the instance types termed
“standard” (std), “micro”, “high-memory” (hi-m), “high-CPU” (hi-c), “cluster
compute” (cl-C), and “cluster GPU” (cl-G). The later two cluster types are in-
tended for High Performance Computing (HPC) applications, and come with 10
Gb ethernet connections; for all other instance types except micro, there are two
or three subinstances of different sizes, indicated by “Large (L)”, “Extra Large
(EL)” and so on. Use of instances can be supported by a variety of operating
systems, ranging from different versions of Unix and Linux through to Windows.
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Pricing model. Instances are charged per instance-hour depending on their
capacity and the operating system used. In 2007 this was done at a flat rate of
$ 0.10 per hour on a 1.7 GHz processor with 1.75 GB of memory [1]; in 2008 the
pricing model used ECUs charged at the same flat rate of $ 0.10 per hour per
ECU [2]. Since then the pricing model has evolved [3]. Currently, instances can be
purchased at three different price bands, “on-demand”, “reserved” and “spot”,
charged differently according to which of four different geographic locations one
is using (US east coast, US west coast, Ireland or Singapore).
On-demand pricing allows purchase of instance-hours as and when they are
needed. After a fixed annual (or higher triennial) payment per instance, reserved
pricing is significantly cheaper per hour than on-demand pricing: it is intended
for parties that know their requirements, and hence can reserve them, ahead of
when they are used. Spot pricing is a short-term, market determined price used
by EC2 to sell off unused capacity. In 2012, the “reserved” instances (which
is of more interest for our purposes) were further divided into light, medium
and heavy utilization bands), and discount of at least 20% is available for those
spending least two million dollars or more.
Table 1. Instance Technical Specifications
Instance cores
ECUs total M2050 RAM
per core ECUs GPUs GB
standard L 2 2 4 0 7.5
high-memory EL 2 3.25 6.5 0 17.1
high-CPU EL 8 2.5 20 0 7
cluster compute
(not specified)
33.5 0 23
cluster GPU 33.5 2 22
For all instances and price bands, Windows usage is more expensive than
Linux/Unix and is therefore not considered. Similarly, 32-bit instances are not
considered, because for all large computing efforts and price bands 32-bit cores
are at least as expensive as 64-bit ones. To enable a longitudinal study we restrict
to the five remaining relevant instances which were available in both 2011 and
2012, and which are most suited to our needs. In Table 1 we present the technical
specification of these instances.
Table 2 lists the current pricing of the relevant remaining instances in both
Feb 2011 and Feb 2012, of which k-fold multiples can be purchased at k times the
price listed, for any positive integer k. Although of course there is a clear upper
bound on k due to the size of the installation of the cloud service. To simplify
our cost estimate we ignore this upper bound, and assume that the provider will
provide more capacity (at the same cost) as demand increases. One thing is clear
is that prices have dropped over the preceeding twelve months, the question is
by how much. Separate charges are made for data transfer and so on, and the
table does not take into account the 20% discount for large purchases.
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Table 2. February 2011 and 2012 US east coast instance pricing, in US dollars, using
64-bit Linux/Unix.
Instance
2011 2012
on-dem. reserved on-dem. reserved
per fixed payment per hour per fixed payment per hour
hour δ 1 yr α 3 yr τ 1 yr 1 3 yr 2 hour δ 1 yr α 3 yr τ 1 yr 1 3 yr 2
std L $0.34 $910 $1400 $0.120 $0.120 $0.32 $780 $1200 $0.060 $0.052
hi-m EL $0.50 $1325 $2000 $0.170 $0.170 $0.45 $1030 $1550 $0.088 $0.070
hi-c EL $0.68 $1820 $2800 $0.240 $0.240 $0.66 $2000 $3100 $0.160 $0.140
cl-C $1.60 $4290 $6590 $0.560 $0.560 $1.30 $4060 $6300 $0.297 $0.297
cl-G $2.10 $5630 $8650 $0.740 $0.740 $2.10 $6830 $10490 $0.494 $0.494
With, for a given instance, δ, α, τ , 1, 3 the four pricing parameters as
indicated in Table 2 and using Y for the number of hours per year, it turns out
that in 2011 we have
1.962(τ + 33Y ) < 3δY < 2.032(τ + 33Y ) (2011 prices)
2.351(τ + 33Y ) < 3δY < 3.489(τ + 33Y ) (2012 prices)
}
(1)
That is, for any instance using on-demand pricing continuously for a triennial
period was approximately two times (now three times) as expensive as using
reserved pricing with a triennial term for the entire triennial period. Further-
more, for all instances reserved pricing for three consecutive (or parallel) annual
periods was approximately 1.3 times (now 1.5 times) as expensive as a single
triennial period:
1.292(τ + 33Y ) < 3(α+ 1Y ) < 1.305(τ + 33Y ) (2011 prices)
1.416(τ + 33Y ) < 3(α+ 1Y ) < 1.594(τ + 33Y ) (2012 prices)
}
(2)
There are more pricing similarities between the various instances. Suppose
that one copy of a given instance is used for a fixed number of hours h. We
assume that h is known in advance and that the prices do not change during
this period (cf. remark below on future developments). Which pricing band(s)
should be used to obtain the lowest overall price depends on h in the following
way. For small h use on-demand pricing, if h is larger than a first cross-over
point γα but at most one year, reserved pricing with one year term must be
used instead. Between one year and a second cross-over point γτ one should use
reserved pricing with one year term for a year followed by on-demand pricing for
the remaining h− Y hours, but for longer periods up to three years one should
use just reserved pricing with a triennial term. After that the pattern repeats.
This holds for all instances, with the cross-over values varying little among them,
as shown below.
The first cross-over value γα satisfies δγα = α + 1γα and thus γα = αδ−1 .
The second satisfies α+ 1Y + δ(γτ −Y ) = τ + 3γτ and thus γτ = (δ−1)Y+τ−αδ−3 .
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For the 2011 prices we find γα ≈ 4100 and γτ ≈ Y + 2200 in all price instances.
But for 2012 there is more variation between the cut-off points.
Our requirements and approach. For each cryptographic primitive studied,
our approach hinges on the use of EC2 to carry out a negligible yet representative
fraction of a certain computation. Said computation, when carried to comple-
tion, should result in a (symmetric- or private-) key or a collision depending
on the type of primitive. For DES, AES, and SHA-2 this consists of a fraction
of the symmetric-key or collision search, for RSA of small parts of the sieving
step and the matrix step of the Number Field Sieve (NFS) integer factorisation
method, and for ECC a small number of iterations of Pollard’s rho method for
the calculation of a certain discrete logarithm.
Note that in each case, the full computation would require at least many thou-
sands of years when executed on a single core4. With the exception of the NFS
matrix step and disregarding details, each case allows embarrassing parallelisa-
tion with only occasional communication with a central server (for distribution
of inputs and collection of outputs). With the exception of the NFS sieving and
matrix steps, memory requirements are negligible. Substantial storage is required
only at a single location. As such, storage needs are thus not further discussed.
Thus, modulo details and with one exception, anything we could compute on a
single core in y years, can be calculated on n such cores in y/n years, for any
n > 0.
Implementing a software component to perform each partial computation on
EC2 requires relatively little upfront cost with respect to development time. In
addition, execution of said software also requires relatively little time (compared
to the full computation), and thus the partial computation can be performed
using EC2’s most appropriate pricing band for short-term use; this is the only
actual cost incurred. Crucially, it results in a reliable estimate of the number of
ECU years, the best instance(s) for the full computation, and least total cost (as
charged by EC2) to do so (depending on the desired completion time). Obviously
the latter cost(s) will be derived using the most appropriate applicable long-term
pricing band.
Minimal average price. Let µ(h) denote the minimal average price per hour
for a calculation that requires h hours using a certain fixed instance. Then we
have
µ(h) =

δ for 0 < h ≤ γα (constant global maximum)
α
h +  for γα < h ≤ Y (with a local minimum at h = Y )
α+Y+(h−Y )δ
h for Y < h ≤ γτ (with a local maximum at h = γτ )
τ
h +  for γτ < h ≤ 3Y (with the global minimum at h = 3Y ).
For h > 3Y the pattern repeats, with each triennial period consisting of four
segments, reaching decreasing local maxima at h = 3kY + γα, decreasing local
4 The processor type can be left unspecified but quantum processors are excluded; to
the best of our knowledge and consistent with all estimates of the last two decades,
it will always take at least another decade before such processors are operational.
6
minima at h = 3kY + Y , decreasing local maxima at h = 3kY + γτ , and the
global minimum at h = 3kY + 3Y , for k = 1, 2, 3, . . .. For all relevant instances,
Figure 1 depicts the graphs of the minimal average prices for periods of up to
six years, per ECU, in both 2011 and 2012.
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Fig. 1. Feb 2011 (top) and Feb 2012 (bottom) minimal average prices per hour per
ECU, in US dollars, as a function of the number of years required by the calculation.
Consequences. Given the embarrassingly parallel nature and huge projected
execution time of each full computation, the above implies that we can always
reach lowest (projected) cost by settling for a three year (projected) completion
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time. Faster completion would become gradually more expensive until comple-
tion time ταY > Y is reached
5, at which point one should switch right away to
a shorter completion time of one year; faster than one year again becomes grad-
ually more expensive until γα is reached, at which point the cost has reached
its (constant) maximum and the completion time is only limited (from below)
by the number of available on-demand copies of the required instance. We stress
yet again that this all refers to projected computation, none of which is actu-
ally completed: all we need is an estimate of the cost of completion, possibly
depending on the desired completion time.
Thus assume that using a certain fixed EC2-instance, a full-scale security
assessment is expected to take y years for a y that will be at least many thou-
sands. The full computation can be completed using that instance by purchasing
about y/3 copies of it using reserved pricing with a triennial term, and to use
each copy for the full triennial period. Whether or not this (i.e., doing this full
computation over the triennial period) is also optimal for that instance depends
on issues beyond our control (such as changed pricing and inflation) and is com-
mented on below. Using the same instance, the entire calculation can also be
completed in one year at ≈ 1.5 (resp. ≈ 1.3 for 2011 prices) times higher cost
(cf. Inequalities (2)), or at three times (resp. double) the cost in an arbitrarily
short period of time (assuming enough copies of the instance are available in
EC2, cf. Inequality (1)).
With all instances behaving so similarly over time for the different price
bands, the best instance for a particular calculation is selected by taking the one
with the lowest hourly rate per ECU as long as it provides adequate memory
and network bandwidth per core. From Table 2 and the description of our needs,
it follows that the high-CPU EL instance will be most useful to us: using EC2
for a computation that is estimated to require y ECU years for some large y
will cost about $ 0.66yY2.5·20 ≈ 115y (resp. $ 0.68yY2·20 ≈ 150y) (cf. Inequality (1)) if we
can afford to wait three years until completion. Completing it in a year will cost
about $ 170y (resp. $ 195y) (cf. Inequality (2)), and doing it as fast as possible
will cost $ 290y (resp. $ 300y) (cf. Inequality (1)).
In a similar fashion we derive costs $ 1.30yY2.4·33.5 ≈ 140y, $ 210y and $ 340y (resp.
$ 210y, $ 272y and $ 420y) for a y ECU year calculation done in three years,
one year, and “ASAP”, respectively, using EC2 cluster-compute instances, and
costs $ 0.45yY3.4·6.5 ≈ 180, $ 270y and $ 605y (resp. 340y, $ 440y and $ 675y) for high-
memory EL instances. Thus, cluster compute and high-memory EL instances are
approximately 20% and 50%-100% (resp. 40% and 120% for 2011 prices) more
expensive than high-CPU EL instances. Note we have not in the above taken
into account the 20% discount for large usage of reserved instances in the 2012
prices.
Accommodating future developments. As one can see prices and pricing
models will change over time, and so may security assessment strategies and their
interaction with advances in processor design and manufacture. In particular,
one could imagine that if a party decided to use the Amazon cloud for key
5 Note that τ
α
≈ 1.5, so τ
α
Y is about a year and a half for all instances.
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recovery or collision search then the increase in demand would induce Amazon
to increase the instance costs. However, we assume that the effect of such supply
and demand on the pricing is relatively constant over a long period of time.
Thus, we assume the non-spot prices are a relatively accurate reflection of the
actual economic cost to Amazon (bar a marginal profit) of providing the service.
The cost estimates produced by our approach are valid at the moment they
are calculated (in the way set forth above), but cannot take any future devel-
opments into account. However, this problem can be mitigated by adopting an
open source model for the software components and using (as far as is sensi-
ble) platform agnostic programming techniques; for example, this permits the
software to maintain alignment with the latest algorithmic and processor devel-
opments, and to add or remove primitives as and when appropriate (cf. [36]).
Almost all our test software used has been made available on a web-site which
will be updated, as years pass by, with the latest costs:
http://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/~nigel/Cloud-Keys/
EC2 versus Total Cost of Ownership (TCO). The approach set forth above
associates a monetary cost to key strength, but does so at negligible actual
cost; this is useful for many purposes. However, no key recovery nor collision
is completed. The question remains, if one desires to complete a computation,
whether doing so on EC2 is less expensive than acquiring a similar platform and
operating it oneself.
TCO includes many costs that are hard to estimate. Nevertheless, the fol-
lowing may be useful. At moderate volume, a dual node server with two pro-
cessors, each with twelve 1.9 GHz cores, and 32 GB of memory per node can
be purchased for approximately $ 8000. This implies that at that fixed cost ap-
proximately 2 · 2 · 12 · 1.9 = 91.2 ECUs with 1 13 GB of memory per core can be
purchased. At $ 2091.2 · 8000 ≈ 1750 per 20 ECUs this compares favourably to the
fixed triennial payment τ = 3100 for the 20 ECUs of EC2-instance high-CPU
EL. Power consumption of the above server is estimated to be bounded by 600
Watts. Doubling this to account for cooling and so on, we arrive at approxi-
mately 265 Watts for 20 ECUs, thus about a quarter kWh. At a residential rate
of $ 0.25 per kWh we find that running our own 20 ECUs for three years costs
us $ 1750 + 3Y 2651000 · 0.25 ≈ 3500, as opposed to $ 3100 + 3Y · 0.16 ≈ 7304 for
EC2’s high-CPU EL.
Although in low-volume such a server could be supported without additional
infrastructure, in high-volume they require a data center and maintenance per-
sonnel; this also implies lower electricity rates and quantum discount for acqui-
sition however. Given expected cost and lifespan of infrastructures and salary
costs, it is not unreasonable to estimate that TCO is at most one half of the cost
of EC2. We conclude that full computations are still best conducted on one’s
own equipment.
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3 Results
In this section we detail the application of our approach to five different cryp-
tographic primitives: the block ciphers DES and AES, the cryptographic hash
function SHA-2, and the public-key cryptosystems RSA and ECC. The first is
chosen for historic reasons, whilst the others are the primitives of choice in many
current applications.
For each of the five primitives, the fastest methods to recover the symmetric-
key (DES and AES), to find a collision (SHA-2), or to derive the private-key
(RSA and ECC) proceed very similarly, though realised using entirely different
algorithms. In each algorithm, a huge number of identical computations are per-
formed on different data; they can be carried out simultaneously on almost any
number (and type) of client cores. With one exception (the NFS matrix step,
as alluded to above), each client operates independently of all others, as long
as there are central servers tasked with distributing inputs to clients and col-
lecting their outputs. Furthermore, for each client the speed at which inputs are
processed (and outputs produced, if relevant) is constant over time: a relatively
short calculation per type of client along with a sufficiently accurate estimate of
the number of inputs to be processed (or outputs to be produced, if relevant)
suffices to be able to give a good indication of the total computational effort
required.
The client-server approach has been common in a cryptographic context
since the late 1980s, originally implemented using a variety of relatively crude
application-specific, pre-cloud approaches [9, 22] (that continue to the present
day [5, 18]), and later based on more general web-based services such as [8] that
support collaborative compute projects (such as [27]). Thus, for each primitive
under consideration, the problem of managing the servers is well understood.
Additionally, the computational effort expended by said servers is dwarfed by
the total computation required of the clients. As a result, in this section we
concentrate on a series of experiments using the client software only: for each
primitive, we execute the associated client software for a short yet representative
period of time on the most appropriate on-demand EC2 instance, use the results
to extrapolate the total key retrieval cost using the corresponding reserved EC2
instance, and relate the result to a discussion of prior work.
We implemented a software component to perform each partial computation
on EC2, focusing on the use of platform agnostic (i.e., processor non-specific)
programming techniques via ANSI-C. In particular, we used processor-specific
operations (e.g., to cope with carries efficiently) only in situations where an
alternative in C was at least possible; in such cases we abstracted the operations
into easily replaceable macros or used more portable approaches such as compiler
intrinsics where possible. As motivated above, the goal of this was portability
and hence repeatability; clearly one could produce incremental improvements
by harnessing processor-specific knowledge (e.g., of instruction scheduling or
register allocation), but equally clearly these are likely to produce improvement
by only a (small) constant factor and may defeat said goal.
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3.1 DES
We first examine DES (which is considered broken with current technology) to
provide a base line EC2 cost against which the cost of other key retrieval efforts
can be measured.
Prior work. As one of the oldest public cryptographic primitives, DES has had
a considerable amount of literature devoted to its cryptanalysis over the years.
Despite early misgivings and suspicions about its design and the development of
several new cryptanalytic techniques, the most efficient way to recover a single
DES key is still exhaustive search. This approach was most famously realised by
Deep Crack developed by the EFF [14]. Designed and built in 1998 at a cost of
$ 200,000, this device could find a single DES key in 22 hours. Various designs,
often based on FPGAs, have been presented since specifically for DES key search.
The most famous of these is COPACOBANA [15], which at a cost of $ 10,000 can
perform single DES key search in 6.4 days on average. One can also extrapolate
from suitable high-throughput DES implementations. For example [33] presents
an FPGA design, which on a Spartan FPGA could perform an exhaustive single
DES key search in 9.5 years. Using this design, in [39][p. 19] it is concluded that
a DES key search device which can find one key every month can be produced
for a cost of $ 750. Alternatively, using a time-memory trade-off [32], one can do
a one-time precomputation at cost comparable to exhaustive key search, after
which individual keys can be found at much lower cost: according to [31] a DES
key can be found in half an hour on a $ 12 FPGA, after a precomputation that
takes a week on a $ 12,000 device.
DES key search. In software the most efficient way to implement DES key
search is to use the bit-sliced implementation method of Biham [6]. In our exper-
iments we used software developed by Matthew Kwan6 for the RSA symmetric-
key challenge eventually solved by the DESCHALL project in 1997. Our choice
was motivated by the goal of using platform agnostic software implementations
of the best known algorithms.
Given a message/ciphertext pair the program searches through all the keys
trying to find the matching key. On average one expects to try 255 keys (i.e.,
one half of the key space) until a match is found. However in the bit-slice imple-
mentation on a 64-bit machine one evaluates DES on the message for 64 keys
in parallel. In addition there are techniques, developed by Rocke Verser for the
DESCHALL project, which allow one to perform an early abort if one knows
a given set of 64 keys will not result in the target ciphertext. For comparison
using processor extensions, we implemented the same algorithm on 128 keys in
parallel using the SSE instructions on the x86 architecture.
DES key search on EC2. Using EC2 we found that y, the expected number of
years to complete a DES calculation on a single ECU, was y = 97 using a vanilla
64-bit C implementation, and y = 51 using the 128-bit SSE implementation.
Combined with our prior formulae of $ 115y, $ 170y and $ 290y (resp. $ 150y,
6 Available from http://www.darkside.com.au/bitslice/.
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$ 195y and $ 300y) for high-CPU EL instances, we estimate the cost of using
EC2 to recover a single DES key as in Table 3. The values are so low that the
Amazon bulk discount has not been applied, however we see that the cost of
obtaining a DES key over a three year period has fallen by 25% in the last year.
However, obtaining the DES key almost instantly has only fallen by 5%.
Table 3. Cryptanalytic Strength of DES on EC2
ECU Estimated Key Retrieval Cost
Implementation 2011 Prices 2012 Prices
Technique Years 3 Years 1 Year ASAP 3 Years 1 Year ASAP
Vanilla C 97 $14,550 $18,915 $29,100 $11,155 $16,490 $28,130
SSE Version 51 $7,650 $9,945 $15,300 $5,865 $8,670 $14,790
In comparing these to earlier figures for special-purpose hardware, one needs
to bear in mind that once a special-purpose hardware device has been designed
and built, the additional cost of finding subsequent keys after the first one is
essentially negligible (bar the maintenance and power costs). Thus, unless time-
memory trade-off key search is used, the cost-per-key of specialised hardware
is lower than using EC2. We repeat that our thesis is that dedicated hardware
gives a point estimate, whereas our experiments are repeatable. Thus as long as
our costs are scaled by an appropriate factor to take into account the possibility
of improving specialised hardware, our estimates (when repeated annually) can
form a more robust method of determining the cost of finding a key.
We end with noting that whilst few will admit to using DES in any appli-
cation, the use of three-key triple DES (or 3DES) is widespread, especially in
the financial sector. Because the above cost underestimates the cost of 255 full
DES encryptions (due to the early abort technique), multiplying it by 2112 lower
bounds the cost for a full three-key 3DES key search (where the factor of 3 in-
curred by the three distinct DES calls can be omitted by properly ordering the
search).
3.2 AES
Prior work. Since its adoption around ten years ago, AES has become the
symmetric cipher of choice in many new applications. It comes in three vari-
ants, AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256, with 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys, re-
spectively. The new cipher turned out to have some unexpected properties in
relation to software side-channels [29], which in turn triggered the development
of AES-specific instruction set extensions [16]. Its strongest variant, AES-256,
was shown to have vulnerabilities not shared with the others [7]. These develop-
ments notwithstanding, the only known approach to recover an AES key is by
exhaustive search. With an AES-128 key space of 2128 this is well out of reach
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and therefore it is not surprising that there seems little work on AES specific
hardware to realise a key search. One can of course extrapolate from efficient
designs for AES implementation. For example using the FPGA design in [40]
which on a single Spartan FPGA can perform the above exhaustive key search
in 4.6 · 1023 years, the authors of [39] estimate that a device can be built for
$ 2.8 · 1024 which will find an AES-128 key in one month.
AES key search on EC2. In software one can produce bit-slice versions of
AES using the extended instruction sets available on many new processors [24].
However, in keeping with our principle of simple code, which can be run on
multiple versions of today’s computers as well as future computers, we decided
to use a traditional AES implementation in our experiments. We found the
estimated number of years y on a single ECU to finish a single AES computation
was y ≈ 1024. Using high-CPU EL instances our costs become (rounding to the
nearest order of magnitude) those give in Table 4.
Table 4. Cryptanalytic Strength of AES on EC2
Algorithm
ECU Estimated Key Retrieval Cost
Years 3 Years / 1 Year / ASAP
AES-128 1024 ≈ $1026
Again our comments for DES concerning the cost of specialised hardware
versus our own estimates apply for the case of AES, although in the present
case the estimates are more closely aligned. However, in the case of AES the
new Westmere 32nm Intel core has special AES instructions [16]. It may be
instructive to perform our analysis on the EC2 service, once such cores are
available on this service7. Whilst a 3-to-10 fold performance improvement for
AES encryption using Westmere has been reported; our own experiments on our
local machines only show a two fold increase in performance for key search.
3.3 SHA-2
Prior work. The term SHA-2 denotes a family of four hash functions; SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. We shall be concentrating on SHA-256
and SHA-512; the SHA-224 algorithm only being introduced to make an algo-
rithm compatible with 112-bit block ciphers and SHA-384 being just a truncated
version of SHA-512. The three variants SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 were
standardised by NIST in 2001, with SHA-224 being added in 2004, as part of
FIPS PUB 180-2 [25]. The SHA-2 family of algorithms is of the same algorithmic
lineage as MD4, MD5 and SHA-1.
7 As of April 2012 none of the 64-bit instances we ran on the EC2 service had the
Westmere 32nm Intel core on them.
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Cryptographic hash functions need to satisfy a number of security prop-
erties; for example preimage-resistance, collision resistance, etc. The property
which appears easiest to violate for earlier designs, and which generically is the
least costly to circumvent, is that of collision resistance. Despite the work on
cryptanalysis of the related hash functions MD4, MD5 and SHA-1 [42–45, 41],
the best known methods to find collisions for the SHA-2 family still are the
generic ones. Being of the Merkle-Damg˚ard family each of the SHA-2 algorithms
consists of a compression function, which maps b-bit inputs to h-bit outputs,
and a chaining method. The chaining method is needed to allow the hashing of
messages of more than b bits in length. The input block size b = 512 for SHA-256
but b = 1024 for SHA-384 and SHA-512. The output block size h is given by the
name of the algorithm, i.e., SHA-h.
SHA-2 collision search. The best generic algorithm for collision search is
the parallel “distinguished points” method of van Oorschot and Wiener [28].
In finding collisions this method can be tailored in various ways; for example
one could try to obtain two meaningful messages which produce the same hash
collision. In our implementation we settle for the simplest, and least costly, of
all possible collision searches; namely to find a collision between two random
messages.
The collision search proceeds as follows. Each client generates a random
element x0 ∈ {0, 1}h and then computes the iterates xi = H(xi−1) whereH is the
hash function. When an iterate xd meets a given condition, say the last 32-bits
are zero, we call the iterate a distinguished point. The tuple (xd, x0, d) is returned
to a central server and the client now generates a new value x0 ∈ {0, 1}h and
repeats the process. Once the server finds two tuples (xd, x0, d) and (yd′ , y0, d′)
with xd = yd′ a collision in the hash function can be obtained by repeating the
two walks from x0 and y0.
By the birthday paradox we will find a collision in roughly
√
pi · 2h−1 appli-
cations of H, with n clients providing an n-fold speed up. If 1/p of the elements
of {0, 1}h are defined to be distinguished then the memory requirement of the
server becomes O(
√
pi · 2h−1/p).
SHA-2 collision search on EC2. We implemented the client side of the above
distinguished points algorithm for SHA-256 and SHA-512. On a single ECU we
found that the expected number of years needed to obtain a collision was given
by the “ECU Years” values in Table 5, resulting in the associated collision finding
costs, where again we round to the nearest order of magnitude and use high-CPU
EL instances. Note, that SHA-256 collision search matches the cost of AES-128
key retrieval, as one hopes would happen for a well designed hash function of
output twice the key size of a given well designed block cipher.
3.4 RSA
NFS background. As the oldest public key algorithm, RSA (and hence inte-
ger factorisation) has had a considerable amount of research applied to it over
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Table 5. Cost of SHA-2 Collision on EC2
Algorithm
ECU Estimated Collision Search Cost
Years 3 Years / 1 Year / ASAP
SHA-256 1024 ≈ $1026
SHA-512 1063 ≈ $1063
the years. The current best published algorithm for factoring integers is Cop-
persmith’s variant [12] of the Number Field Sieve method (NFS) [21]. Based on
loose heuristic arguments and asymptotically for n→∞, its expected run time
to factor n is
L(n) = exp((1.902 + o(1))(log n)1/3(log log n)2/3),
where the logarithms are natural. For the basic version, i.e., not including Cop-
persmith’s modifications, the constant “1.902” is replaced by “1.923”. To better
understand and appreciate our approach to get EC2-cost estimates for NFS, we
need to know the main steps of NFS. We restrict ourselves to the basic version.
Polynomial selection. Depending on the RSA modulus n to be factored, se-
lect polynomials that determine the number fields to be used.
Sieving step. Find elements of the number fields that can be used to derive
equations modulo n. Each equation corresponds to a sparse k-dimensional
zero-one vector, for some k ≈√L(n), such that each subset of vectors that
sums to an all-even vector gives a 50% chance to factor n. Continue until at
least k + t equations have been found for a small constant t > 0 (hundreds,
at most).
Matrix step. Find at least t independent subsets as above.
Square root. Try to factor n by processing the subsets (with probability of
success ≥ 1− ( 12 )t).
Because L(n) number field elements in the sieving step have to be considered
so as to find k + t ≈ √L(n) equations, the run time is attained by the sieving
and matrix steps with memory requirements of both steps, and central storage
requirements, behaving as
√
L(n). The first step requires as little or as much
time as one desires – see below. The run time of the final step behaves as
√
L(n)
with small memory needs.
The set of number field elements to be sieved can be parcelled out among
any number of independent processors. Though each would require the same
amount
√
L(n) of memory, this sieving memory can be optimally shared by any
number of threads; smaller memories can be catered for as well at small efficiency
loss. Although all clients combined report a substantial amount of data to the
server(s), the volume per client is low. The resulting data transfer expenses
are thus not taken into account in our analysis below. The matrix step can be
split up in a small number (dozens, at most) of simultaneous and independent
calculations. Each of those demands fast inter-processor communication and
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quite a bit more memory than the sieving step (though the amounts are the
same when expressed in terms of the above L-function).
It turns out that more sieving (which is easy, as sieving is done on indepen-
dent processors) leads to a smaller k (which is advantageous, as it makes the
matrix step less cumbersome). It has been repeatedly observed that this effect
diminishes, but the trade-off has not been analysed yet.
Unlike DES, AES, or ECC key retrieval or SHA-2 collision finding methods,
NFS is a multi-stage method which makes it difficult to estimate its run time. As
mentioned, the trade-off between sieving and matrix efforts is as yet unclear and
compounded by the different platforms (with different EC2 costs) required for
the two calculations. The overall effort is also heavily influenced by the properties
of the set of polynomials that one manages to find in the first step. For so-
called special composites finding the best polynomials is easy: in this case the
special number field sieve applies (and the “1.902” or “1.923” above is replaced
by “1.526”). For generic composites such as RSA moduli, the situation is not so
clear. The polynomials can trivially be selected so that the (heuristic) theoretical
NFS run time estimate is met. As it is fairly well understood how to predict a
good upper bound for the sieving and matrix efforts given a set of polynomials,
the overall NFS-effort can easily be upper bounded. In practice, however, this
upper bound is too pessimistic and easily off by an order of magnitude. It turns
out that one can quickly recognise if one set of polynomials is “better” than some
other set, which makes it possible (combined with smart searching strategies
that have been developed) to efficiently conduct a search for a “good” set of
polynomials. This invariably leads to substantial savings in the subsequent steps,
but it is not yet well understood how much effort needs to be invested in the
search to achieve lowest overall run time.
The upshot is that one cannot expect that for any relevant n a shortened
polynomial selection step will result in polynomials with properties representa-
tive for those one would find after a more extensive search. For the purposes of
the present paper we address this issue by simply skipping polynomial selection,
and by restricting the experiments reported below to a fixed set of moduli for
which good or reasonable polynomials are known – and to offer others the pos-
sibility to improve on those choices. The fixed set that we consider consists of
the k-bit RSA moduli RSA-k for k = 512, 768, 896, 1024, 2048 as originally pub-
lished on the now obsolete RSA Challenge list [34]. That we consider only these
moduli does not affect general applicability of our cost estimates, if we make
two assumptions: we assume that for RSA moduli of similar size NFS requires a
similar effort, and that cost estimates for modulus sizes between 512 and 2560
bits other than those above follow by judicious application of the L-function.
Examples are given below. We find it hazardous to attach significance to the
results of extrapolation beyond 2560.
Prior work. Various special purpose hardware designs have been proposed for
factoring most notably TWINKLE [37], TWIRL [38] and SHARK [13]. SHARK
is speculated to do the NFS sieving step for RSA-1024 in one year at a total
cost of one billion dollars. With the same run time estimate but only ten million
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dollars to build and twenty million to develop, plus the same costs for the matrix
step, TWIRL would be more than two orders of magnitude less expensive. Not
everyone agrees, however that TWIRL can be built and will perform as proposed.
In 1999 NFS was used to factor RSA-512 [10] using software running on com-
modity hardware. Using much improved software and a better set of polynomials
the total effort required for this factorisation would now be about 3 months on a
single 2.2GHz Opteron core. In 2009, this same software version of NFS (again
running on regular servers) was used to factor RSA-768 [17]. The total effort of
this last factorisation was less than 1700 years on a single 2.2GHz Opteron core
with 2 GB of memory: about 40 years for polynomial selection, 1500 years for
sieving, 155 years for the matrix, and on the order of hours for the final square
root step. The matrix step was done on eight disjoint clusters, with its compu-
tationally least intensive but most memory demanding central stage done on a
single cluster and requiring up to a TB of memory for a relatively brief period of
time. According to [17], however, half the amount of sieving would have sufficed.
Combined with the rough estimate that this would have doubled the matrix
effort and based on our first assumption above, 1100 years on a 2.2GHz core
will thus be our estimate for the factoring effort of any 768-bit RSA modulus.
Note that the ratio 11000.25 = 4400 of the efforts for RSA-768 and RSA-512 is of
the same order of magnitude as L(2
768)
L(2512) ≈ 6150 (twice omitting the “o(1)”), thus
not providing strong evidence against our second assumption above.
Factoring on EC2. Based on the sieving and matrix programs used in [17] we
developed two simplified pieces of software that perform the most relevant siev-
ing and matrix calculations without outputting any other results than the time
required for the calculations. Sieving parameters (such as polynomials defining
the number fields, as described above) are provided for the fixed set of moduli
RSA-512, RSA-768, RSA-896, RSA-1024 and RSA-2048. For the smallest two
numbers they are identical to the parameters used to derive the timings reported
above, for both steps resulting in realistic experiments with threading and mem-
ory requirements that can be met by EC2. For RSA-896 our parameters are
expected to be reasonable, but can be improved, and RSA-896 is small enough
to allow meaningful EC2 sieving experiments. For the largest two numbers our
parameter choices allow considerable improvement (at possibly substantial com-
putational effort spent on polynomial selection), but we do not expect that it
is possible to find parameters for RSA-1024 or RSA-2048 that allow realistic
sieving experiments on the current EC2: for RSA-1024 the best we may hope
for would be a sieving experiment requiring several hours using on the order of
100 GB of memory, increasing to several years using petabytes of memory for
RSA-2048.
The simplified matrix program uses parameters (such as the k value and the
average number of non-zero entries per vector) corresponding to those for the
sieving. It produces timing and cost estimates only for the first and third stage
of the three stages of the matrix step. The central stage is omitted. For RSA-512
and RSA-768 this results in realistic experiments that can be executed using an
EC2 cluster instance (possibly with the exception of storage of the full RSA-768
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matrix). For the other three moduli the estimated sizes are beyond the capacity
of EC2. It is even the case that at this point it is unclear to us how the central
stage of the RSA-2048 matrix step should be performed at all: with the approach
used for RSA-768 the cost of the central stage would by far dominate the overall
cost, whereas for the other three moduli the central stage is known or expected
to be negligible compared to the other two.
Table 6 and Table 7 list the most suitable ECU instance for each program
and the five moduli under consideration so far, and the resulting timings and
EC2 2012 cost estimates (including 20% discount where appropriate, i.e. for one
and three year costs of over two million dollars) for RSA-512, RSA-768, and
RSA-896. The figures in italics (RSA-896 matrix step, both steps for RSA-1024
and RSA-2048) are just crude L-based extrapolations8.
Table 6. RSA Sieving Step
Modulus Instance
ECU Estimated Sieving Cost
Years 3 Years 1 Year ASAP
RSA-512 high-CPU
EL

0.36 N/A N/A $107
RSA-768 1650 $190,000 $280,000 $480,000
RSA-896
high-mem
EL
8<:
1.5 · 105 $2.2 · 107 $3.3 · 107 $9.1 · 107
RSA-1024 2 · 10 6 $2 .9 · 10 8 $4 .3 · 10 8 $1 .2 · 10 9
RSA-2048 2 · 10 15 $≈ 10 17
Table 7. RSA Matrix Step
Modulus Instance
ECU Estimated Matrix Cost
Years 3 Years 1 Year ASAP
RSA-512 high-CPU EL 0.1 N/A N/A $30
RSA-768
cluster
compute
8><>:
680 $95,000 $142,000 $231,000
RSA-896 3 · 10 4 $3 .3 · 10 6 $5 .0 · 10 6 $1 .0 · 10 7
RSA-1024 8 · 10 5 $8 .9 · 10 7 $1 .3 · 10 8 $2 .7 · 10 8
RSA-2048 8 · 10 14 $≈ 10 17
The rough cost estimate for factoring a 1024-bit RSA modulus in one year
is of the same order of magnitude as the SHARK cost, without incurring the
SHARK development cost and while including the cost of the matrix step.
8 We note the huge discrepancy between EC2-factoring cost and the monetary awards
that used to be offered for the factorizations of these moduli [34].
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3.5 ECC
Prior Work. The security of ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) relies on
the hardness of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (EC-DLP). In
1997 Certicom issued a series of challenges of different security levels [11]. Each
security level is defined by the number of bits in the group order of the elliptic
curve. The Certicom challenges were over binary fields and large prime fields, and
ranged from 79-bit to 359-bit curves. The curves are named with the following
convention. ECCp-n refers to a curve over a large prime field with a group order
of n bits, ECC2-n refers to a similar curve over a binary field, and ECC2K-n
refers to a curve with additional structure (a so-called Koblitz curve) with group
order of n bits over a binary field.
The smaller “exercise” challenges were solved quickly: in December 1997 and
February 1998 ECCp-79 and ECCp-89 were solved using 52 and 716 machine
days on a set of 500 MHz DEC Alpha workstations, followed in September
1999 by ECCp-97 in an estimated 6412 machine days on various platforms from
different contributors. The first of the main challenges were solved in November
2002 (ECCp-109) and in April 2004 (ECC2-109). Since then no challenges have
been solved, despite existing efforts to do so.
ECC key search. The method for solving EC-DLP is based on Pollard’s rho
method [30]. Similar to SHA-2 collision search, it searches for a collision between
two distinguished points. We first define a deterministic “random” walk on the
group elements; each client starts such a walk, and then when they reach a
distinguished point, the group element and some additional information is sent
back to a central server. Once the servers received two identical distinguished
points one can solve the EC-DLP using the additional information. We refer to
[28] for details.
ECC key search on EC2. Because most deployed ECC systems, including
the recommended NIST curves, are over prime fields, we focus on elliptic curves
defined over a field of prime order p. We took two sample sets: the Certicom
challenges [11] which are defined over fields where p is a random prime (ECC-
p-X), and the curves over prime fields defined in the NIST/SECG standards
[26, 35], where p is a so-called generalised Mersenne prime (secpX-r1), thereby
allowing more efficient field arithmetic. Of the latter we took the random curves
over fields of cryptographically interesting sizes listed in the table below.
All of the curves were analysed with a program which used Montgomery
arithmetic for its base field arithmetic. The NIST/SECG curves were also anal-
ysed using a program which used specialised arithmetic, saving essentially a
factor of two. Table 8 summarises the costs of key retrieval using high-CPU EL
EC2 instances in May 2012, rounded to the nearest order of magnitude for the
larger p. We present the costs for the small curves for comparison with the effort
spent in the initial analysis over a decade ago. Note that general orders of mag-
nitude correlate with what we expect in terms of costs related to AES, SHA-2,
etc.
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Table 8. Cryptanalytic Strength of ECC on EC2
Curve Name ECU Estimated Key Retrieval Cost
Name Years 3 Years / 1 Year / ASAP
ECCp-79 3.5 days N/A / N/A / $ 2
ECCp-89 104 days N/A / N/A / $82
ECCp-97 5 $580 / $850 / $1,500
ECCp-109 300 $35,000 / $51,000 / $87,000
ECCp-131 106 ≈ $108
ECCp-163 1010 ≈ $1012
ECCp-191 1015 ≈ $1017
ECCp-239 1022 ≈ $1024
ECCp-359 1040 ≈ $1042
secp192-r1 1015 ≈ $1017
secp224-r1 1020 ≈ $1022
secp256-r1 1025 ≈ $1027
secp384-r1 1044 ≈ $1046
4 Extrapolate
Comparing the current pricing model to EC2’s 2008 flat rate of $ 0.10 per hour
per ECU, we find that prices have dropped by a factor of three (short term) to
six (triennial). This shaves off about two bits of the security of block ciphers over
a period of about three years, following closely what one would expect based on
Moore’s law. The most interesting contribution of this paper is that our approach
allows anyone to measure and observe at what rate key erosion continues in the
future. A trend that may appear after doing so for a number of years could
lead to a variety of useful insights – not just concerning cryptographic key size
selection but also with respect to the sanity of cloud computing pricing models.
In future versions of this paper these issues will be elaborated upon in this
section. Right now the required data are, unavoidably, still lacking.
5 Can one do better?
If by better one means can one reduce the overall costs of breaking each cipher
or key size, then the answer is yes. This is for a number of reasons: Firstly one
could find a different utility computing service which is cheaper; however we
selected Amazon EC2 so as to be able to repeat the experiment each year on
roughly the same platform. Any price differences which Amazon introduce due
to falling commodity prices, or increased power prices, are then automatically
fed into our estimates on a year basis. Since it is unlikely that Amazon will cease
to exist in the near future we can with confidence assume that the EC2 service
will exist in a year’s time.
Secondly, we could improve our code by fine tuning the algorithms and adopt-
ing more efficient implementation techniques. We have deliberately tried not to
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do this. We want the code to be executed next year, and the year after, on
the platforms which EC2 provides, therefore highly specialised performance im-
provements have not been considered. General optimisation of the algorithm
can always be performed and to enable this have made the source code available
on a public web site, http://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/~nigel/Cloud-Keys/. How-
ever, we have ruled out aggressive optimisations as they would only provide a
constant improvement in performance and if costs to break a key are of the order
of 1020 dollars then reducing this to 1018 dollars is unlikely to be that significant
in the real world.
Finally, improvements can come from algorithmic breakthroughs. Although
for all the algorithms we have discussed algorithmic breakthroughs have been
somewhat lacking in the last few years, we intend to incorporate them in our
code if they occur.
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